
Navigating the Risks of GNSS Interference
Aviation Intel Briefs (AIBs) deliver timely insights on developments that may impact the aviation industry.
Whether urgent or emerging, AIBs prioritize relevance over completeness and may draw from preliminary sources. ARI includes reputable references and mitigation resources when available. Briefs may be updated as new information becomes available.
Executive Summary
Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS)—like GPS—are foundational to modern aviation. From lateral navigation and timekeeping to surveillance and ADS-B positioning, GNSS is embedded in flight safety and operational efficiency.
But with reliance comes risk—and that risk is growing.
In the past five years, GNSS jamming and spoofing incidents have evolved from isolated tactical acts to strategic tools of statecraft, conflict, and counterspace competition. Their effects can be disruptive—and in rare cases, dangerous.
Where the Risks Are Emerging
Based on open-source reporting, NOTAM analysis, and intelligence monitoring, ARI has identified six active or emerging GNSS interference hotspots as of Q2 2025:
Region | Observed Activity | Assessment / Implications |
High Arctic |
|
|
South China Sea |
|
|
Kaliningrad / Baltics |
|
|
Eastern Mediterranean (Cyprus/Syria/Israel) |
|
|
Iran and the Strait of Hormuz |
|
|
Horn of Africa / Yemen / Gulf of Aden |
|
|
Operational Effects of GNSS Interference
The following operational impacts reflect real-world challenges associated with GNSS interference, spoofing, or navigation system degradation—particularly within high-risk regions such as the North Atlantic or polar corridors. Each point is supported by guidance from the ICAO North Atlantic Operations and Airspace Manual (NAT Doc 007, 2025-1), which outlines industry-standard procedures for contingency management, airspace navigation, and operational resilience across NAT High Level Airspace (HLA).
- FMS Reversion – Flight crews may need to switch to IRS or dead reckoning mid-flight (NAT Doc 007 §6.5.9).
- Waypoint Misses – Disrupted positional awareness can cause track deviations, requiring ATC intervention (NAT Doc 007 §6.6.4–6.6.5).
- ATC Load Increases – Degraded ADS-B or CPDLC effectiveness in oceanic sectors adds stress to procedural control (NAT Doc 007 §10.7.6–10.7.7).
- Dispatch Complexity – Routes over high-risk FIRs may require additional contingency planning and fuel reserves (NAT Doc 007 §11.6.27).
- Safety and Liability – Operators must document anomalies to protect themselves from regulatory or legal exposure (NAT Doc 007 §6.5.10 & §6.6.2).
ARI Recommendations
ARI is advising its clients to:
- If not already standard, integrate GNSS risk awareness into flight operations culture and brief leadership on active hotspots.
- Collect any observed GNSS impacts from flight crews and use them to ensure that crews operating in regions with known GNSS impacts are aware of the company’s collected intelligence.
- Coordinate with OEMs to ensure IRS alignment procedures and reversion protocols are current and robust.
- Educate crews and dispatchers on real-time interference indicators. Ensure checklists are in paper-based formats.
- Use ARI’s monthly Aviation Risk Intelligence Briefs to integrate GNSS interference into route risk matrices.
ARI continues to monitor GNSS interference trends and will update clients as threat patterns evolve.
Share This Article
Connect With Us
Latest Articles
April 26, 2025
April 26, 2025
April 26, 2025